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1906





SPONSORS
OR
CONSCRIPTION.

SPONSORS
OR
CONSCRIPTION.

AN ATTEMPT TO SOLVE
THE RECRUITING PROBLEM

BY

MAJOR H. R. S. MAITLAND,
RESERVE OF OFFICERS.

LONDON :

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PREFACE.

HOWEVER desirable its object, the practical value of any scheme must depend on the feasibility of its main proposals. In submitting the accompanying suggestions the writer takes the opportunity firstly to remind his readers that nearly every reform urged in these pages has, in some shape or other, been advocated before by other people; secondly, he would intimate that in formulating this interlacement of schemes and presenting the whole in one definite plan worked out with some exactness, that course has been taken, not from any wish to appear didactic, but simply to prove and if possible carry conviction to the doubting that the central idea for which the author himself is responsible is not at all unworkable.

The writer (I suppose like every other contriver of schemes) is, rightly or wrongly, convinced that his plan is not merely a reasonable, but the Only solution of the Reeruiting Problem now perplexing the Nation. He does not, however, expect everybody to agree with him. He will be satisfied if his plan be examined. To facilitate any such inspection he supplies figures and estimates in the earnest hope that the Scheme as a whole may obtain the consideration of all those who—in or out of office—are at present engaged in forwarding the interests of the British Army.

H. R. S. MAITLAND.

PERRYMEAD HOUSE, BATH,
September, 1906.

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ARGUMENT.

The armed forces of the Crown taken as a body are no better now than in 1899.

LORD ROBERTS.

Speech in House of Lords, July 10, 1906.

How are we to find an Army numerically sufficient to defend our possessions far oversea when they are within striking distance, as they were not forty-five years ago, to a great military power? . . . (this) great problem lies at the root of every rational attempt to deal with the question of Imperial Defence.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR.

Speech to Volunteers, Sept. 9, 1905.

The Deserts have been crossed . . . This our breathing space.

LORD KITCHENER.

(Again and again),

Ours is a Voluntary Service. You have to depend on the inducements which you—the Government and the nation—coming into the open market can give to the youth of our country.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR.

At the United Club



SPONSORS OR CONSCRIPTION.

AN EXPANSORY ARMY.

It is certainly very desirable that we should have an Expansory Army, for without an Expansory Army we shall not be able to strike or strike back effectively on land as well as by sea in the initial stages of a great national emergency. Now the country is powerless to do this at present, and no scheme ever yet mooted for the remodelling of our regular army or any other part of our land forces, and continuing to recruit them on a voluntary plan, has given us any indication whatsoever that our national defensive arrangements will ever succeed in placing us in that desired state of preparedness. No plan at all ever yet propounded has made a pretence of promising the availability of a reasonably sufficient reserve of Scientific Arms of "continental" fighting efficiency, whose presence will alone enable the nation to gain time and make some headway in the first phase of the war whenever such deplorable event shall happen to surprise us.

Bearing in mind the certain inevitable military exigencies of a great national crisis, is there any doubt at all lurking anywhere as to our present dangerous shortage in the matter of men trained in the work of the Scientific (and other) Arms? Are we some thirty thousand short in Cavalrymen? Are we short of Artillerymen (and guns), of Engineers, of Army Service Corps? All the military experts seem to agree that we are most dangerously deficient in all these particulars. The Report of the Director of Recruiting (March, 1906) tells exactly the same story. Are we going to remain short? It seems inevitable that we must, for under present arrangements, and any other arrangements ever yet proposed, it is simply not within the range of possibility to set about manufacturing that desired reserve of men of the Scientific Arms on the availability of whom the very existence of the nation depends and hangs. This impossibility is due to the best or worst of all reasons, namely, an insufficiency of the particular kind of material which is required before the

process of manufacture can begin. Material, that is to say, of fibre and texture sufficiently strong to stand the wear and tear of conversion into the required article. There may be other reasons, but these are secondary—the one I have mentioned is unhappily all-sufficient. It lies at the root of all army discontents and embarrassments, it is, in fact, the Recruiting Difficulty which must be overcome before we can ever secure the desired provision of the reserve of the Scientific Arms.

The writer will have failed in his purpose if he do not convince his readers that the recruiting scheme which he is about to advocate will assuredly secure to the nation those Scientific Arms without increasing the Estimates. My object is to show how we can provide an overseas army which shall enable this country to strike, or strike back effectively on land as well as by sea. I will outline the arrangements which I propose for the maintenance in the United Kingdom, of a force of professional soldiers of continental fighting efficiency, some three hundred thousand strong, available for service overseas, so that on the occasion of a great national emergency a future War Minister shall be able to despatch from these shores, at the very commencement of hostilities, an army of say two hundred thousand men, properly grouped and balanced with the due proportions of the Scientific Arms.

That is the first objective of the scheme.

But my scheme has another aim, the achieving of which you will allow to be indeed very desirable, if only it can be attained. If we remember that ours is a voluntary army, and then approach the question from a point of view other than purely military, what stands out as glaringly wrong and outrageous in the existing aspect of affairs? Is it not the misery of the reservists and ex-soldiers? Misery directly to be traced to our present system of recruiting, which has been tried and proved utterly unsound. A system which does not guarantee the future of men who enter a *voluntary* army must be unsound, and what they say in the House of Commons is absolutely and entirely right. It is an absurd system inadapated to our needs. It *does* add more to the sum of human misery than any other institution of the kind. It is a mean and cruel thing to take men for seven or eight years and throw them back into the labour market. Somebody will at once object and break in with:—*“How can it be mean and cruel when these men enter of their*

“own free will? It is a case of a simple contract between “employer and employee.” To these I would say, Surely you are making a mistake, you are not thinking clearly, it is not a case of an ordinary contract, it is a case of joining a voluntary army. These men enter the army, at least most of them do, because they happen to be rather better men than the majority of their neighbours who object to fighting for themselves, otherwise why this widespread objection to universal military service? The great majority of men enter this voluntary army because their generous soldierly instincts over-master their ordinary prudence and compel them to enlist. Would any man of ordinary prudence engage in a voluntary service with his future unguaranteed? Now the State, according to my view, ought to say to itself:—“In making this contract there is “not the slightest doubt that I know what I am about, but I “am not at all sure that these admirable young men do know “what they are letting themselves in for. I am not at all sure “that I am right in trading on these young fellows’ (most of “them mere lads) generous instincts. It is all very well to “say I will teach them a trade while they are in the army, “but nobody knows better than myself that it is extremely “dubious whether this arrangement, which sounds so excellent, “is not after all very illusory. Will this trade idea have any “practical effect in the case of a man going back into civil life “after seven or eight years in the army? He may have some “smattering of a knowledge of a craft, but where is his “business connection? A business connection has to grow. “In the case of a two-year or three-year man it is different. “A man aged twenty-one or twenty-two can find work very “much more easily than a man of twenty-eight. A man of “twenty-eight is set, his habits are formed. Grattan was “perfectly right, you cannot transplant an oak at fifty or at “thirty either. If I can possibly think of any system to do “away with medium service I certainly shall give it a trial, “because, after all, I, the State, am these men’s natural “protector, and it would certainly be a most deplorable “thing if they, as a class, begin to suspect I am not.” Thus my ideal War Minister.*

* My ideal War Minister seems—at least to the writer—to speak such very good sense that I think he must be allowed to “carry on” for the remainder of these preambulatory remarks.

Therefore the aim of this scheme is twofold—firstly, to provide the reserve of the Scientific Arms, which will enable the country to tide over the first nine months of the great national emergency—enable her, in fact, to get her second fighting wind; secondly, to somehow or other secure the future of every man who from now shall enter the ranks of the regular army.

Very well then, the providing of the Scientific Arms and the securing of the future of the soldier. You will see that by concentrating on the second aim I shall secure the first without extra cost to the Estimates. Now in the matter of the supply of men to the army—the first thing to remember is that the scheme must provide for normal as well as abnormal needs; that is to say, the army machinery which I am going to set up must meet the exigencies of the drafts and the striking force as well as those of the emergency. Well, long service and short service is clearly indicated, Longs for policing the empire, Shorts to form the reserve. To secure the future of the Longs Government employment and pensions, as described in the admirable schemes* so often advocated in the publications of the Army League, is clearly what is wanted. This means money; well, somehow or other I must get that money.

Now for the Shorts. These must be resettled back into civil life after they have done their time with the colours, not by those excellent societies who are already doing so much good, but by me, the State, with the help of those societies, and the benevolent countenance of the outside public, who for very shame will not refuse to help Government in this entirely just and reasonable and humane undertaking. The resettling of these reservists will mean an organization of officers to be spared from the Home Establishment. How shall I be able to spare these? Because I am going to get such good *personnel* into the army, that that portion of the men of the Home Establishment which at present cannot be counted as military assets, will no longer form part of the establishment. The "actual" number of men with the colours of the Home Establishment will be smaller, but there will be a corresponding increase of men in the reserve, who will cost me next to nothing, and will be very valuable military assets indeed.

* See footnote to pages 21 and 32.

But how shall I attract into the service this improved *personnel*? By letting it be known that from now the future of every man is going to be guaranteed.

It is perfectly plain—is it not?—that the securing of good *personnel*, and the being able to place men in the reserve instead of keeping them with the colours, means saving of money. Now, if I save money, all these pensions and bounties and gratuities, &c., can be paid for, but *am* I absolutely certain that the guaranteeing of the future of the men *will* attract them in the first instance? By “attract them,” I mean attract an enormous number of candidates for admittance into the army, from which great number of candidates I can make an extraordinarily good pick?

How can I make certain, absolutely certain, of engineering this enormous rush of candidates? By advertising? Ordinary sort of advertising? That does not sound somehow effective. How can I get over that dreadful attitude of the would-be soldier's relations and friends who are all trying to persuade him not to go into the army? That they do so try and persuade him is, of course, unhappily, too apparent. A General Officer writes to me:—“The recruit class is “the most difficult in the world to deal with. They “always believe that some trap is laid for them, and certainly “in this command the good treatment a man receives and the “good pay he gets does not affect recruiting in the least.” And what does the Director of Recruiting in his Report say? “Advertising is costly, and to provide the necessary funds to “carry it out thoroughly would involve a large outlay. It “must be remembered that even at railway stations no “advertisement for the army or navy can be displayed without payment.” (Here is patriotism for you!) “The general “opinion is that advertising is an excellent aid to the “recruiter, but cannot be substituted for him.”

“The best advertisement for recruiting is the contented, “well-behaved soldier who, by example, induces his friends “to enlist.”

“The pay has been so largely increased of recent years “that there is no doubt that it compares favourably with “that of the unskilled labourer in civil life.”

“IT IS THEREFORE OF FIRST IMPORTANCE THAT THE “PRESENT ADVANTAGES OF PAY IN THE ARMY SHOULD BE “WIDELY KNOWN.”

So you see the difficulty of the situation,—the Government does not get any credit at all for the splendid pay and admirable treatment which the soldier at present receives while he is with the colours. Am I not then absolutely justified in saying that this proves that present methods of recruiting are inadequate, have indeed utterly failed? On the other hand, of course, we must remember that Government has not up to now secured the soldier's future. . . . The recruiting classes are full of doubt, dislike and distrust, . . . the outside public are coldly indifferent, utterly apathetic, and wanting in patriotism. . . . Now is it not perfectly clear that any ordinary methods of dealing with the situation are entirely out of place? The "safe, sound Conservative method" of doing business is not exactly what is called for on this most special occasion, for everything depends on getting over this Recruiting Difficulty. I say EVERYTHING, for it means the getting of the Scientific Arms, which means an expansory Army, which means England being able to strike effectively on land as well as by sea, her being respected as an ally. The safety of India, the peace of Western Europe, and the future of the whole human race seem really to depend and hang on the simple question—Can I or can I not get my recruiting conditions known? With such gigantic issues perpending do you think I am going to use the ordinary methods, placards, posters, and the like? These will not have the slightest effect—you might as well hope to take Sebastopol with pea-shooters. Present recruiting methods only succeed in reconnoitring the difficulty, and that is not enough. I want to blow it to atoms. The difficulty, of course, is disturbing, but the danger of doing anything less is appalling. We *must* succeed in this or else we are done. How can I convert the entire recruit class? That is, how can I bring them all round to believe in Government? How shall I create that excellently good understanding between them and Government which already undoubtedly exists inside the Service between them and their officers? Will any scheme at all contrive this work of gladness? Can the ingenuity of man devise any plan which shall advertise—and, if possible, continue automatically to advertise—what I, or rather Government, is going to do for benefiting the soldier, in a *manner sufficiently adequate to enable Government to find the funds to do it?* Any scheme at all, however outré and

improbable it may at first glance appear—any scheme, I say, which shall get the Scientific Arms and at the same time secure the future of the soldier, is good enough for me Advertisement Advertisement What does Advertisement mean? People talking Why should they talk? I wish they would, though — how perfectly delightful if the soldier's *own relations and friends* could only be got to say, "Why don't you go into the army?" "I cannot think why you don't enlist." "Just look what Government are doing for you." "Just read these conditions: I am not going to press you, but just read this." "For Heaven's sake, don't throw away this chance—For your own sake! For my sake," &c., &c.

One hundred thousand people eternally canvassing like that would meet the case, which reflection at once brings me to the Sponsor idea, and I forthwith unfold

THE SCHEME.

Which provides that the total HOME FORCE (exclusive of all national and other associations for training the able-bodied, youths of this country to the use and understanding of the rifle) shall consist of two categories:—

- a.* THE OVERSEAS ARMY.
- b.* THE TERRITORIAL VOLUNTEER ARMY.

No further remarks whatsoever are made in the present proposals as to *b*; the scheme concerns itself solely with *a*, and provides that:—

THE OVERSEAS ARMY.

343,777 men, exclusive of officers, shall consist of:—

1. Home Establishment of the Regular Army	101,353
2. The Militia and Yeomanry Army	106,619
3. The Reserve	135,805

Total numbers of Home Establishments	} 343,777
of that portion of THE BRITISH ARMY	
available for service over seas	

The entire *personnel* of the overseas army are enlisted and receive their initial training in the Regular Army.

THE REGULAR ARMY.

224,453 men, exclusive of officers, shall consist of :—

Home Establishment	-	-	-	-	101,353
Colonies	-	-	-	-	*48,100
India	-	-	-	-	75,000
Total					<u>224,453</u>

The Regular Army consists of men enlisting for long service or short service ; these are called Longs and Shorts respectively. Longs serve everywhere—at home, in the colonies, and in India. Longs do not serve in any but the Regular Army. Shorts serve in peace time at home, in war time anywhere. Longs and Shorts serve in the same units at home. Battalions are linked, Longs being drafted to the sister unit abroad as required.

The Military and Yeomanry Army.—The personnel to consist of Reservists from the Regulars.

The Reserve.—To consist of Reservists who shall have completed their time in the two other armies.

TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

LONGS :—

Number of Longs, 149,128 (home 38,128, colonies 36,000,

India 75,000 : Total 149,128).

Number of Recruits required, say, 9,000.

Age of enlistment, 19 to 21.

Length of service, 20 years.

Reserve service, *nil*.

Pay, the present rate.

Universal War Batta, 2s. daily.

Refresher bounties : After 12th year £28 7s., after 19th
£27 6s.

* This includes 12,100 Colonial and native Indian troops.

*On completion of service 10 years' Government employment guaranteed.

Annuity pension : At age 48 or 49, £30.

* The Government contributes £11 and the soldier £1 towards the provision of these refresher bounties and annuity pension. £2 accumulating at 3 per cent. for the first 19 years added to the last year's premium of £12 will furnish the refresher bounties. Why is it proposed to give these refresher bounties? Because the man will be probably marrying about the 12th year, and after the 20th year a sum of ready cash would be extremely useful to the soldier on the occasion of his settling into the Government situation which, under the scheme, is reserved for all long service soldiers on expiration of their 20 years' service. The remainder of the money—that is to say, the £10 annually—will, accumulating at 3 per cent. compound interest for 19 years, amount to a sum which will secure on the life of a male, aged 38, a deferred annuity of £30; the first yearly payment to be made at the end of 10 years. With the exception of the refresher bounties this part of the scheme is taken *in toto* from the plans so often urged in publications of the Army League, the present writer merely adopts it and adapts it to his own scheme, and adds the refresher bounties. See "An Army in the Making," chap. V., where the whole subject of Pensions by the Investment System is luminously set forth and explained. Read also the following from *Truth*:—"The plan proposed by the Army League, which, differently from the National Service League, works on the principle that compulsory service would not be accepted by the nation, and must therefore be considered outside the range of practical discussion, appears to be worthy of most serious consideration. It is that soldiers should serve for twenty years or so, and then receive a pension, or a situation for ten years, and a deferred pension on attaining the age of fifty. It is proposed that for every long service soldier £9 a year should be paid to an insurance company, and that eventually he should receive an annuity, based on the amount of the accumulated payments. On actuarial calculations the Army League states that if the annuity were deferred to a man's fiftieth year, the premiums for 150,000 men would cost the country £1,350,000 a year, and that each man at fifty would receive 13s. 4d. a week for life. This system would be more economical than the present one, under which £1,744,000 is paid yearly in pensions to 84,380 soldiers. Dr. George Potter, well known in connection with the Royal National Pension Fund for Nurses, and an expert in such matters, states that if such a system were adopted, both for officers and men, the country would save £2,000,000 a year on the non-effective list, which is assuming such colossal and ever-increasing proportions. It seems probable that out of the proposals of *Truth* and the Army League a satisfactory system could be evolved. The fundamental principle is that if we want to secure soldiers of a good class, physically and morally, we must provide for their future." . . . —*Truth*, March 8th, 1906.

In the event of it being desirable to enlist a certain number of men for 12 years and not for 20 years, the 12-year man under the scheme would enjoy exactly the same conditions as the 20-year man, *i.e.*, he would, on completing his 12 years receive the refresher bounty and the actuarial value of his future pension in one lump sum, namely, £170 6s. The writer need not point out that it is extremely dubious whether this money would remain long in the man's possession, but this clause is inserted to meet the case of those men who cannot, or will not, or for any reason should not, remain with the colours for the full 20 years.

SHORTS :—

Men enlist for Short Service as in Table A :—

TABLE A.

Number of Men in Short Service Category.	Age of Enlistment.	Arm.	Number of Recruits listed annually.	Service in Regular Army.	Service in Militia and Yeomanry Army.	Service in Reserve Army.
68,225	19-25	Cavalry - -	4,547	3	3	6
		Artillery - - -	4,500	3	3	6
		Engineers* - - -	1,333*	3	3	6
		Army Service Corps	2,000	1	3	8
		Army Medical Dept.	1,000	1	3	8
		Infantry - - -	15,000	2	5	5

Infantry Recruits 15,000 }
 Other Arms ... 13,380 } 28,380 is the total number of
 Shorts recruited annually.

Pay in the Regular Army as at present, but Universal War Batta 2s. daily.

In the Militia and Yeomanry Army 5s. a day clear pay during the 14 days' annual training.

* An appreciable proportion of this number would not, of course, be kept for as long as three years with the colours. Some Engineers (*telegraphists, enginemen, &c.*) pass nearly all their service in the reserve. All the better for the money part of the scheme.

When mobilized the rates of pay will be exactly the same as those of the Regular Army, exclusive, of course, of the Universal War Batta.*

In the reserve £3 retaining fee, no training at all except when mobilized.

GRATUITY :—Every man on completing his service in the Regular Army and joining the Militia and Yeomanry Army, shall be entitled to a gratuity: a man, who has served one year with the colours receiving £13 13s. 9d.; a 2-year man, £27 15s., and a 3-year man, £42 6s. 1d. These gratuities are lying to the men's credit in the Regimental Rainy-day Fund of the regimental district to which the soldier belongs. The gratuities are of the nature of deferred pay, they represent the sum of 9d. paid every day by Government throughout the one, two, or three years that the man be serving with the colours; the 9d. per day accumulating at 3 per cent. amounting to the sums mentioned. The regimental Rainy-day Fund is administered by regimental district officers, 500 of whom are in peace time stationed in the various regimental districts engaged in recruiting, and in the resettling of reservists back into civil life. The officer pays the reservist his gratuity, but he does not hand over the whole of the money until the man be in work. As soon as the reservist succeed in getting employment, the remaining portion of his gratuity is paid to him, but the officer must be perfectly satisfied that he (the reservist) is definitely planted in the billet which he has been so fortunate to obtain. But although only a portion of the gratuity may be handed to the man prior to his getting back into work, the reservist will receive from the officer every possible sort of assistance in getting that employment. As many as 52 or 53 such reservists will fall to the lot of each regimental district officer every year. The officer will clearly understand that the replanting of these men back into civil employment is a duty to which he cannot pay too much attention, and in the carrying out of which extraordinary tact and ingenuity will be called for.

METHOD OF ENLISTMENT.—*Men for short service are not enlisted in the ordinary manner. In view of the extraordinary*

* i.e. Every man on active service—Regular or Citizen soldier—gets 3s. 6d. a day.

care which Government proposes to take of the man's welfare, both while he is with the colours, and also during his period of service in the Militia and Yeomanry Army and Reserve, it, has been thought necessary, to safeguard such attention being thrown away, to institute very special measures to secure exceptionally able-bodied, steady, and intelligent men being admitted into the Service at the outset. Henceforward, therefore, every man accepted for short service shall have to be vouched for by a sponsor, who must prove to the satisfaction of the recruiting officer, that the would-be recruit is a young man of such sufficiently staid, steady character, as to merit being admitted into the Army under the proposed improved conditions. In future, the duty of the recruiting officer will be to select, pass, or reject, not to search for or solicit. The canvassing and finding of the recruits is left in the hands of the public. The business of recruiting is thus thrown absolutely open to everybody. Anybody may be a sponsor, a sponsor may be anybody of any age, of either sex. In the event of a man being accepted for service, the sponsor is paid certain money, this money is called a separation allowance, and is paid as follows :—

SEPARATION ALLOWANCE :—In the event of a recruit successfully passing the standards and being admitted into the Army, the recruit's sponsor, whosoever he or she may be, shall, in virtue of the service to the State which he or she, the sponsor, shall have successfully carried through in having secured for His Majesty's Government an approved recruit, be entitled to receive the following money reward, entitled Sponsor Separation Allowance, namely, One Shilling a day for as long as his or her nominee remain with the colours of the short service category of the Regular Army, and serve and behave in a reasonably satisfactory manner. Grave misconduct entailing stoppage of pay of the soldier, automatically stops for the time sponsor separation allowance.

A sponsor, if he or she shall choose to forego his or her claim to separation allowance, shall not be allowed to assign the same to any individual whatsoever, he or she may, however, direct that the said money be paid into the Rainy-day Fund of the Regimental district to which his or her nominee's regiment belongs.

A man desirous of entering the Service may, if he can prove his case, be his own successful sponsor, but in this case he must forego receiving for himself the separation allowance, he must assign it to the General Rainy-day Fund of the district to which he belongs.

Pluralism is allowed, a sponsor may bring any number of

recruits, and no deduction whatever shall be made from his separation allowances if he be successful in achieving his purpose in the case of more than one nominee. Sponsors are allowed all reasonable freedom of action. While canvassing they may say what they like, they are, however, prohibited from printing or publishing anything at all in their official character. Government leaflets and other recruiting literature may be obtained gratis at any Post Office.

What will be the result of this proclamation? Will not the entire recruit class, that is to say, the whole of that great section of the community from whom we at present do not obtain the sort of recruits we require in sufficiently adequate numbers, will not they all at once want to become sponsors? And the men themselves? Every soldier on furlough, every militiaman, every yeoman, every reservist immediately becomes an ardent recruiter. For though recruiting is thrown absolutely open, ex-soldiers will undoubtedly have a very great pull in canvassing over the rest of the population, and this is extremely fitting. For what does the Director of Recruiting say:

"The best advertisement for recruiting is the contented, well-behaved soldier . . . who induces his friends to enlist."

"It is, therefore, of first importance that the present advantages of pay in the Army should be widely known."

Widely known! Is there a shadow of a shade of a chance that the sponsors will allow any doubt to continue to exist anywhere at all in the United Kingdom on the subject of the excellent treatment a young man may expect who shall enter the Army for a few years?

The plan, it will be allowed, is reasonably comprehensive and sweeping, but is it not a perfectly just scheme? In the case of a short service soldier a separation allowance appears a very reasonable arrangement. Is it not fitting that family life be dislocated as little as possible in the case of a man who is only wanted with the colours for two or three years, and who is not going to make the service his profession? Why should old Mrs. So-and-so, who spares her son temporarily to the Service, be mulcted of the 5s. or so that son is probably giving her every week from the wages he is getting before he enlists? Why should she suffer for her patriotism?

But in the case of no relationship. Surely it is perfectly right and proper and good economy to pay the recruiter well? What sound objection can be raised against doing so? A man

may not be able to fight for his country, but at least he should be encouraged to talk, and if he talk successfully in her interests, should he not be paid? Who can possibly object? If anyone at all think the successful recruiter receives too much pay, let him at once adjust the matter to his own satisfaction by becoming a sponsor himself.*

How in the world can the plan possibly fail in the matter of getting the men? It is perfectly incredible that in the whole of the United Kingdom there is an insufficiency of the sort of recruits that are required; there is a sufficiency if only they could be reached, that is to say if only sufficient publicity can be given to the excellent terms which Government is *already* offering in the matter of treatment and pay while with the colours, and the still more attractive terms Government could offer in the event of reducing to an absolute certainty the securing of this improved *personnel*.

And what excellent terms are offered under the scheme. The Long man is quite happy with his refresher bounties, Government employment and pension annuity, the Short is quite happy with the excellent treatment he receives while with the colours, and his resettlement by Government back into civil employment, together with a handsome

* It may with good reason be urged that a sponsor who is no relation to the soldier should hardly receive the same separation allowance as a father, mother, sister, brother, child, wife, or any other person or partner with a genuine *bona-fide* claim on the man's good offices. Perfectly true, but this I am afraid is the fortune of war. I have gone somewhat fully into the matter, and am satisfied that there would be insuperable objections to making any difference in the payment of sponsors. Any distinction would open the door to fraud and all sorts of misrepresentations. This would necessitate a large staff being maintained to investigate claims of relationship, etc. Another very strong reason in favour of a universal rate in the matter of these separation allowances is this:—In any and all terms of service offered to this recruit class you cannot be too utterly clear and definite. All distinctions, modifying clauses and conditions are viewed with the very deepest distrust. It is a question whether they are at all understood. Now everyone can understand "One Shilling pay to A for every day that B's away."

Let me forestall another objection. Is 1s. a day too much as a separation allowance? I do not think that it is. As far as I have been able to sound this recruit class (and anyone can do so if he take the necessary trouble), I am certain any less sum would fail in *achieving the purpose in view*. One shilling a day will succeed where *9d., 10d., 11d. or even 13d.* will fail.

gratuity. He goes into the Militia and Yeomanry Army for, say, three years (in the case of Infantry five years), he gets every year a most enjoyable fortnight while in training, and goes away with £3 10s. in his pocket. After three years he is not bothered with any training at all; he gets, however, a nominal retaining fee of £3 as a sort of annual reminder from the authorities that they still continue to take an interest in his welfare. During the whole of his career he can add to his income by engaging in recruiting work. Should war break out, he turns up and gets the ordinary pay of a soldier, together with his

UNIVERSAL WAR BATTALION.

Now, I do not believe that this particular reform of an Universal War Battalion will meet with anything but adhesion from everybody. I am encouraged to be of this opinion as not only is it an entirely humane, beneficent and fair arrangement, but it is also, as I shall prove, a very sound economic measure. The country actually makes money over it in the case of a big war happening in the course of the next ten years. For, take the cost of a small expedition. Say 20,000 men are required for a little war lasting four months. This means war battalion 2s. multiplied by 20,000 men multiplied by 120 days equals £240,000, *i.e.*, an extra £240,000 on to the cost of the expedition. Say there are in the next ten years ten such expeditions, this would mean an extra cost under "extraordinary charges" of £2,400,000 spread over ten years.

Now, see what it saves in a big war. The country wants to send 250,000 professional soldiers from England across the seas. At present they cannot do this, they can only send 120,000 Regulars plus 130,000 Civilian soldiers. These Civilian soldiers cost 5s. a head, or 1s. 6d. more than my professional soldier, who costs 3s. 6d. including his war battalion. Now in the arrangements which I advocate the Universal War Battalion holds a most distinguished position among the recruiting attractions offered in the conditions of service. It sounds extremely well, and the sponsors are never tired of talking of it. It is indeed *the* trump card they use while canvassing. Well, under my arrangements, which are rendered *possible by the recruiting conditions being found acceptable*

the Government are enabled at the time of a great crisis to send across the seas 250,000 men, which means that the country saves the difference between 5s. and 3s. 6d. on each of these 130,000 men for every day as long as the big war lasts. Say it lasts about a year and four months (500 days) 1s. 6d. \times 500 \times 130,000 = £4,875,000. So we save £4,875,000 on the first year and a quarter of a big war, that is to say a saving of £2,475,000 of hard cash to the country in the next ten years, and the giving of inexpressible relief and freedom from harassment of mind to 450,000 British soldiers on occasions when these defenders of the Empire are doing the State a very particular service! Does anyone say "Oh! but perhaps there won't be a big war?" Well, perhaps there will not. In which case I will have saved you not two or three millions but eighty millions, the whole cost of the big war, for unless we have an Overseas Army available there certainly will be a big war, and the availability of an Overseas Army depends on the attractiveness of my recruiting conditions, in which, as I say, this Universal War Batta is given such a well-deserved and just prominence.

Lastly, there is not a vestige of fairplay in the present charity system. A man engaging in a "popular war" gets plenty of assistance from kind and well-intentioned people, but the very same man fighting in Sikkim or Tirah does not get any outside help at all, which is most grossly unfair. Besides it is most unbecoming and unseemly that the soldiers of the country should be left to the chance of charity on this or any other occasion.*

* It gave the writer very great pleasure to hear a very distinguished Soldier (with an unparalleled experience behind him of command of men in the field) remark on this subject, "I quite sympathise in that idea, it is entirely sound and just. I think everyone will agree with you on that point. Indeed, I think you may take it from me that never again will the regular soldier be asked to receive a lower wage than the citizen patriot serving by 'his side.'" This is good news indeed, but surely it is a very great pity that Government should not get the credit and the Service the benefit *now* of this most popular (and economical) reform by giving the widest publicity to the same in all recruiting conditions?

WHAT DOES THE SPONSOR PLAN COST ?

The creation of sponsors, highly paid as they are, means a saving of money to the Nation.

How so ?

Thus :—

Look at the Estimates which I furnish on folding sheet at the end of the book.

Look at the cost and saving items opposite the 12th year.

	£
Longs' pensions' premiums cost ...	1,640,408
Shorts' gratuities cost ...	865,393
Sponsors' separation allowances ...	1,153,857
	<hr/>
	£3,659,658
	<hr/>

Thus £3,659,658 secures the futures of Longs and Shorts and advertises to the entire recruit class that this has been done. (The separation allowances not only ensure the unceasing activity of sponsors, but also give an extraordinary measure of happiness and contentment to the short service soldiers themselves, family life being dislocated as little as possible while the men are serving for their one, two, or three years with the colours.)

The attractive nature of these recruiting conditions results in the Army being flooded with the best of *personnel*.

The consequent elimination of waste enables a gradual reduction of men actually serving with the colours. This is spread over four (or more) years, and means that, when the scheme is in full swing, 39,749 less men have to be voted for in the annual estimates (as compared with the last estimates, 1906-7).

This means a saving of £2,384,940

The Militia and Yeomanry Army consist of Reservists from the Regulars. These being already trained men only require an annual fortnight's training on manoeuvres, &c. No permanent staff of instructors, &c. No retaining fees. The men get excellent pay and a fortnight's holiday with everything found. They have all got billets, *i.e.*, have been settled back into civil employment. They have also received a handsome gratuity. If mobilised for war they get their Universal War Batta. The Reserve get £3 yearly retaining fees, not 6d. a day as at present. But they get their Universal War Batta if mobilized.

Saving on these arrangements...	£1,873,811
			<u>£4,258,751</u>


For other details of cost and saving, *see* Appendix.

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THE OVERSEAS ARMY.

Look at Table B on the folding sheet. Here you see at a glance the entire *personnel* of the Overseas Army provided under the Scheme in a normal year. It will be observed that instead of some 70,000 recruits being annually admitted, as now, into the Regular Army and Militia, only some 38,000 would be required under the proposed arrangements for the purposes of both armies. The entire number of these recruits pass through the mill of the Regular Army.

Before discussing the abnormal needs and exigencies of a great national emergency, and whether the scheme will or will not provide for such a crisis the desired availability of a numerical sufficiency of the Scientific Arms, let us see whether the plan meets the normal military necessities of this country in the matter of the Foreign Drafts and the maintenance of a small striking force ready for immediate service in a "Little War."

THE DRAFTS.

There are under the scheme (in a normal year) 75,000 men in India, 48,100 men in the Colonies. Deduct from this latter figure, 12,100 Colonial and Native Indian troops. This leaves 36,000 white troops in the Colonies. That is to say, 110,000 men serving abroad. 110,000 Longs. There are in England 38,128 Longs. 9,000 Longs (approximately) are recruited annually. They serve as under:—

Home	-	-	-	2 years.
India	-	-	-	7 years.
Home	-	-	-	2 years.
India and Colonies	-	-	-	8 years.
Home	-	-	-	1 year.

That is to say, 15 years abroad in two foreign tours. Why not? The champions of medium service always say you cannot keep men more than seven years in India. Certainly not at a stretch, but after a two years' term in England would not the man be perfectly fit and ready to proceed again to the East? He will probably be on the married establishment by

that time, and there does not seem any very good reason why he should not be ready with all the alacrity in the world to spend another eight years abroad, knowing, as he will, that he has only to wait another nine years before getting a comfortable post under Government* at home, this to be followed by an annuity pension.

*As to the question of Government being able to provide employment for a term of years to the long-service soldiers let me quote from the writings of an expert on the subject. The following is an excerpt from pp. 111 and 112 of the Army League publication entitled "An Army in the Making."

CIVIL EMPLOYMENT FOR LONG-SERVICE SOLDIERS.

Let us now turn to the means at the disposal of the State for providing employment and pensions for time-expired long-service men. Of these, whatever the wastage might be in passing through the ranks, there could only be about 5,000 to be annually provided for, not all of whom might desire employment under Government. These billets should be only tenable for ten years, and it is therefore necessary to find from fifty to sixty thousand posts suitable for healthy, reliable, disciplined men of thirty-seven years of age. A large proportion of the following positions should be available †

In the Police and Constabulary of the United Kingdom ¹	60,000
Under the Postmaster-General	60,000
In Military Departments at home and in India	2,000
On the permanent staff of Auxiliary Forces ...	6,300
As Barrack Wardens, employment in Ordnance and Clothing Departments and Factories ²	7,673

There are also many berths in the Customs,³ Arsenal, Prisons,⁴ and Government Messenger Departments, Royal Parks,⁵ etc. In 1902 there were employed on the railways of the United Kingdom 11,720 ex-soldiers. There ought therefore to be no difficulty for an employment bureau at the War Office to place these "soldiers of the Empire" in comfortable positions where they would prove admirable public servants. A great advantage in the system here proposed would be that all these men would have finished their military career, which would obviate the great inconvenience caused by employing Reserve men in important positions.

† In 1902 the following vacancies occurred :—

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. 5,801, of which 1,360 were given to soldiers. | 4. Fifty-six soldiers appointed. |
| 2. There were 2,508 vacancies. | 5. To all this class of situation 144 soldiers and sailors were appointed in 1905. |
| 3. Thirty-seven soldiers appointed. | |

NOTE.—Theoretically one-half of the situations in the Postal

Which would the man rather do? Go to India or the Colonies for a second term of service with his future completely secured, or leave the service and run the chance of the workhouse?

Will this scheme provide

A SMALL STRIKING FORCE?

i.e., a small expeditionary force of superlative quality, numbering, say, some 20,000 of all arms? Look at the column in Table B called "Total with the Colours." Here we have 45,700 infantry and 53,525 of the other arms.

In war time drafts are stopped, but after deducting recruits and sick will there still be sufficient for the small striking force? Of the infantry there is no overflowing surplus, but is there not enough? From 45,700 deduct 20,000 recruits (15,000 Shorts and, say, 5,000 Longs); this leaves 25,700. Deduct, say, 4,000 sick; this leaves 21,700. Say there are on the Home Establishment 75 or 80 battalions. Could not those next for active service be kept at a higher strength than the others? * Say that there are 20 such units, each unit containing—after recruits and sick have been deducted—

Department are, I understand, open to ex-soldiers. The actual number filling established and un-established situations, however on March 31st, 1905, were 6,677. Of 4,311 appointments to the establishment in 1905 only 99 were given to ex-soldiers, the explanation being that suitable candidates were not forthcoming. The total number of appointments made to the establishment in the year 1904-5 was 4,311, viz., almost as many as are asked for in this article from all departments of State.

* In a perfect system the battalions would all be of equal strength, but symmetry is not to be hoped for in every part of the arrangements for keeping the Army in being. But I submit it is very essential that the various parts of the Army machinery should be kept at least in existence, though I do not think it matters very much if a good many of them are not in full play in a time of profound peace. Therefore, I would not abolish any units at all, for without cadres and officers how can the Army on occasion expand? Besides, under my plan, officers of the shrunken battalions are required in other directions. But as to the units which are low on the roster for active service, I would shrink them to a very low figure indeed. For would not the exigencies of the striking force be met in an adequate manner by the strong units plus the Blue Militia, and in the event of a big crisis the weak units could be brought to full strength by men from the Reserve?

400 men. You want for the little war, say, 12,000 infantry. Take 15 of these battalions, add to each of them four reinforcing company units, and you have a total strength for your expeditionary force of 12,000 infantry in 15 battalions of 800 men each. Where do the reinforcing company units come from? They come from the special service section of the Militia and Yeomanry Army, called for shortness

THE BLUE MILITIA.

This is a force of 7,000 men immediately available for active service, and is provided in the following manner:— In each Militia battalion there is a special service company kept up to full fighting strength, composed entirely of men who, on special terms, engage from year to year to serve in this *corps d'élite*; each company has of course its own Militia officers who in the same manner take on from year to year, and are ready at a moment's notice to proceed on active service. These special service companies train for 21 days (not for 14 like the rest of the Militia), they do not train with the Militia and Yeomanry Army, but with the Regulars, and are present at the latter's manœuvres, field firing, etc. During their training the Blue Militia units are of course attached to those battalions of the Regulars with whom they will be serving when actually mobilised for war. Thus when the time does come for them to proceed on active service they will feel themselves quite at home among familiar surroundings and old comrades. But in addition to their 21 days' training the fighting efficiency of this *corps d'élite* is otherwise provided for and greatly intensified by the following arrangement:—Throughout the year, while following their ordinary civilian avocations, men belonging to the Blue Militia are engaged in perfecting themselves in the matter of marksmanship. This they do at the nearest local rifle range, and here, as everywhere else, every sort of facility is afforded to help the men to keep themselves in an extraordinary state of fighting effectiveness. (For pay, &c., of this Blue Militia, see remarks on Column 5 of the Estimates page.) The above arrangements are what the scheme provides for the maintenance of the small striking force, but with regard to the exigencies of—

A GREAT NATIONAL EMERGENCY.

What advantages has the scheme to offer over those afforded by the present system?

I submit that it will give the Army a certain measure of expansoriness, as will be seen from the figures furnished below. The figures in the left-hand column are taken from page 22, Army Estimates; and page 17, Report of Director of Recruiting. The present system provides, of course, in addition, the present *personnel* of the Militia and Yeomanry. But these Auxiliary Forces, as at present constituted, cannot—we are told by the military experts—pretend to that degree of fighting efficiency to enable them to meet Continental troops. They certainly cannot be counted as military assets towards furnishing the first fighting line of this country in the event of a big crisis.*

—	Present System with the Colours of the Home Establish- ment and in the Reserve.	Proposed System.
Cavalry	20,086*	51,977
Artillery	41,389*	58,459
Engineers	10,480*	17,375
Infantry	147,115*	177,471
Army Service Corps ...	9,202	23,578
Army Medical Department	4,667	12,789
Total	232,939	341,649

The figures with asterisk *include* the officers on full pay; the figures of proposed system are those of men, *exclusive of officers*.

* "Within the last three years two Royal Commissions have reported, in the plainest possible language, that the Auxiliary Forces, as they now exist, are not fit to take their place against an organised enemy."—LORD ROBERTS, July 10, 1906.

Do my proposals give better value in the matter of availability of men trained in the work of the Scientific Arms than the arrangements of

MR. HALDANE'S SCHEME

as outlined in the memorandum issued on August 3rd as a White Paper?

This memorandum does not state what surplus in the matter of recruits, sick and ineffectives are allowed for, over and above the numbers given for the Expeditionary Force and those provided to make good the war wastage for the first six months of the war. I therefore deduct 25 per cent. off the figures which I have furnished above, in which I have included everybody. The figures in the two columns below may be taken to represent the men, exclusive of officers, of Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers, who will be fit and available to take the field in the first six months of a big war, when either of the two schemes would be in full swing.

	Mr. Haldane's Scheme. Men exclusive of Officers.	My Proposals. Men exclusive of Officers.
Cavalry - - - -	15,713	38,982
Artillery - - - -	39,362	43,842
Engineers - - - -	9,060	12,929

But Mr. Haldane's 15,713 Cavalry include some thousands of Yeomanry! The proposal to count on these latter as Cavalrymen is perfectly astounding. To use mounted troops who have not undergone continuous training for at least two or three years, and to pit them against troops of Continental fighting efficiency, is not this simply to invite a military disaster of the first magnitude? The writer does not pretend to be a Cavalry expert, he has only the ordinary experience of an ordinary regimental Infantry officer. But no military man at all whom he has ever met, heard, or read of, has ever said *anything different*. The justice of my remark is too utterly *obvious*. One need not be a cricketer to understand that a

remarkably good college team would stand no chance at all against the Australian Eleven. It is hard to believe that the proposal to use Yeomanry, as the term is at present understood, in an Overseas Army, is to be taken seriously.

But even supposing that these 15,713 were all real Cavalrymen,* that is to say, had all undergone a genuine continuous course of training in the Regular Army, the number is utterly inadequate. It is simply not enough by more than one-half. Mr. Haldane's 15,713 Cavalry are evidently thought to be sufficient to balance the 111,923 Infantry provided by his scheme. But we know very well that in the case of a real big crisis—a life and death struggle—at least double this number of Infantry will find their way overseas during the first six months of the war. Of this there is no real doubt entertained by anybody. Whoever else will be wanting, Infantry certainly will be available, they will be swarming to the front (just as they would have done in the last war had there but been an organisation ready to receive them). This being so, the inevitable question presents itself and waits for an answer: How in this world are you going to balance the Infantry with the necessary Cavalry? Cavalrymen cannot be improvised. It takes three years to make a Cavalryman. No one can take the place of a trained Cavalryman or a trained Mounted Infantryman. In a highly civilized country like ours reasonably efficient substitutes for continuously-trained mounted troops are not to be found. They are simply non-existent. In the day of the country's extremity £1,000,000 will not buy one Lancer.

In the matter of Artillery, Mr. Haldane's proposals are so disturbing that when one starts to criticise one hesitates where to begin. I cannot do better than simply give *in extenso* the remarks of a most able and earnest army reformer, whose pamphlet on "Political Opportunism, Not Military Efficiency," has just reached me. His remarks carry conviction and chime in with everything one has ever heard or read in

* And this I expect is precisely what they will turn out to be—ex-soldiers. The show-troops or half-troops of all the various Yeomanry regiments. The mounted branch of the Citizen Army will be bled white to meet the necessities of the first six months of the campaign, instead of being mobilised on the outbreak of hostilities, and carefully trained in England to meet the exigencies of the second or third phase of the war.

connection with this extraordinarily important and vital matter, the supply of artillerymen.

"Political expediency is the prevailing note in Mr. Haldane's proposals for army reform. The least capable members of the Radical party demand 'retrenchment': accordingly a paltry retrenchment amounting to a few hundred thousands is resolved upon, though it may mean ruin. In truth there is practically no retrenchment, and there is no reform. . . . The Artillery is to be reduced—although it is even now insufficient for the 183,000 of our Regular Army and there is none at all for the 370,000 Militia and Volunteers. This crime is attempted to be justified by throwing the responsibility upon the late Government

"The Militia Garrison Artillery, though now deemed useless, are to be turned into ammunition columns for the Royal Artillery, and when quick-firers are available, 108 guns are to be distributed among thirty-six field batteries of four and two guns each, to be formed out of these militiamen as a sort of second line Artillery.

"For soldiers, no comment on this proposal is needed: but to civilian tax-payers and voters we point out:—(a) That for the Artillery branch of the service our great military rivals select the flower of their men and train them for three years. (b) That guns costing many thousands of pounds are too precious to be trusted to any but the most expert soldiers: that inferior men cannot put them to effective use: that such men are liable to allow the guns to fall into the hands of the enemy, whose superior gunners turn them promptly and destructively upon their first owners. (c) That Artillery ammunition trains are of vital importance and cannot be trusted to unskilled and undisciplined drivers. (d) That very few of these disbanded garrison artillerymen can ride, and that a few weeks' training cannot make them either drivers or gunners. (e) That the Government cannot be depended upon to provide the requisite animals to horse these batteries: they will hire a few 'corks' from Pickford's."

This writer certainly does not seem at all pleased with the "increased efficiency" of this part of the White Paper scheme.

The simple truth is, that if you are going to cut down the *Estimates*, or even leave them as they are, no plan at all on a *voluntary basis* will give you the barest sufficiency of a reserve

of the Scientific Arms, unless by some extraordinary means or other you first succeed in utterly changing the attitude of the recruit class towards government. Flood the army with good *personnel* (three-quarters of the army is splendid already), eliminate waste, and you will be able to build up the reserve of the Scientific Arms. But you will not succeed in this without sponsors.

I have called my scheme "Sponsors or Conscription," and that is precisely the situation. I mean, of course, conscription for home service, and a voluntary army for foreign service. The great objection to this is the cost. Mr. Arnold Forster has told the country it would mean another £25,000,000 a year on to the Estimates. Twenty-five millions of money!

Universal military training will not meet the want of the Scientific Arms. This great movement would prove of incalculable benefit to the nation but it will not *of itself* save the country from ruin. Where will the Artillery and Cavalry come from to balance the Infantry? Is it not very desirable, and indeed vitally necessary, that some arrangement or other should be made now in "this our breathing space" which will enable those responsible for the conduct of the big war to make use of those masses of Infantry the availability of whom can be more or less confidently counted on? With a fairly reasonable supply of Artillerymen, Cavalrymen, Engineers, Army Service Corps, Army Medical, etc., available, there would be no danger of this country not being able to at least live through the first or second phase of the war. It would be really interesting to know what the general idea is in making no provision to rectify our existing deplorable deficiency in the matter of Cavalry not to mention any other Arm at all. But for the exigencies of a great crisis there is another very glaring want which has been insisted on again and again by those best qualified to speak. In the matter of

THE SUPPLY OF OFFICERS

Lord Roberts tells us in his public pronouncements that "We are in a far worse condition than we were as regards the men," and the shortage of company officers in particular to meet the sudden inevitable wants of the great crisis is very much insisted on. The scheme accordingly provides for the *formation of*

A CORPS OF SHORT-SERVICE OFFICERS.

Establishment. 1,400 Officers in training.
4,000 in Reserve (these include the officers of the Militia and Yeomanry Army).

Age of Entry. 17 to 23.

Length of Service. 2 years in training, 10 years in Reserve.

Pay. While in training £220 annually to cover everything. In Reserve no retaining fee whatever, for no contract whatever is made. The officer may, however, gather in as many certificates (with £25 accompanying each certificate) as he may choose to collect at the yearly or half-yearly examinations in any subject whatever of military science named in the Government syllabuses. A record of such successes, of course, will be kept, as when employed on service the officers' status and rank in the Army will, in a great measure, depend on the extent and the nature of his acquirements.

All officers of the overseas army to pass through this corps.

The two years in training will be spent, not at Sandhurst, but in the home unit of the regiment to which the young officer is gazetted. The idea is this—that an entrance examination into this corps be held yearly, and 700 commissions offered. A young gentleman aged 17 or 18 leaves school and passes his examination successfully. He is at once gazetted to a commission in the home battalion of his territorial regiment. From that moment he costs his parent or his guardian nothing at all in the way of education, Government educates him for two years practically and technically. At the end of two years an examination in the practical matters which they have learnt decides which of these young officers remain in the army and make the service their profession. About 300 pass; the remaining 400 go into the *reserve of this corps of short-service officers*, a great many

receiving commissions in the Militia and Yeomanry army. Let us see how this arrangement will benefit, firstly, Government; secondly, the young man's father or guardian; thirdly, the young gentleman himself. Government scores because only £440 has been spent in securing to the State for the next ten years a trained company officer on whose services, should they be needed, the country can count with absolute confidence in the event of a national crisis; that this is so being due, of course, to the admirable spirit common to all ordinary young English gentlemen. The parent of the young gentleman is, under this arrangement, no longer burdened with the expense of tutors, &c., during the two years. The young man himself scores very heavily indeed, and it is quite just that he should. He has an exceedingly pleasant life during the two years of training, and even should he fail to pass at the final examination, the blow of not being able to make the army his profession will be softened by the fact that he is either in the Militia or Yeomanry army or at any rate still in the Reserve of short-service officers. The time spent on his military education has not been thrown away, as the training he has there received, and the entirely healthy and wholesome life he has lived, will be of no disadvantage to him, whatever other career he may take up. Moreover there is no objection at all to his trying again and again to pass into the service if his heart be set on it, but even if he fail his case will be ever so much better than at present, for you see under the present arrangements he or his father or guardian gets nothing at all for all the money and time which has been expended in his special preparation for the Army examination, besides which all his friends and acquaintances are advised of the fact that he has failed for the Army, while under my scheme he will not have failed of becoming at any rate a short-service officer. And is it not certainly desirable that every young English gentleman should have had the chance of being a soldier?

I wish to emphasize the fact that under the scheme no contract whatever is made at the moment of the young man entering the Reserve, for once you make a contract you will have to pay him retaining fees, and, as I have already pointed out, no contract whatever is necessary; indeed, I am strongly of opinion that any attempt to make one would inevitably *cause the guardian or parent to think twice before allowing*

the young gentleman to join the corps and undergo the training in the first instance.

As to the educational part of these proposals, I would remark that although I hold very strongly the opinion that *all* officers of the Overseas Army should be subjected, in the initial stage of their career, to a course of practical technical instruction, not in a class or a college, but in the respective units of the various arms of the Service, I am not so foolish as to underrate the value of the instruction as instruction administered under present arrangements at

SANDHURST.

But is not this teaching given at the wrong time, at the wrong stage, that is to say, of the student's career? Why should theory precede practice? Within a few weeks of leaving Sandhurst the young officer may be on active service trying to perform satisfactorily the ordinary functions of an ordinary company officer. His stay at the Royal Military College will not have prepared him especially for the proper execution of the only duties he will be called upon to carry out. He will not be able to escape making blunder after blunder in the ordinary everyday technicalities of his work—this from want of practice. Is it not obvious that nothing but practice in company work can make a company officer? The teaching at Sandhurst should, I think, come later in the officer's career. And why should the whole curriculum of the Royal Military College be crammed into one course? Nowadays similar educational establishments exist in India, and, this being so, I suggest that Sandhurst be kept as a centre of military learning whither an officer might be allowed to go at intervals during the first six, seven, or eight years of his career. Here he would make a short sojourn, with the definite purpose of learning the latest ideas in any one particular subject to which he would already have devoted himself by private study while with his regiment. Under this plan a stay at Sandhurst would be time scientifically spent. The student would certainly be likely to succeed in acquiring the particular military knowledge he was in quest of. He would, with his initial practical training, already possess a foundation of a perfect familiarity with the *A B C* elements of the several ordinary everyday activities

of actual military work, and, thus prepared, is it not extremely likely that better results would be attained than under the present plan, where a totally raw young cadet, with his brain already strained and tired after his Army examination, is confronted with the theory of the whole field of military subjects, in no single one of which he has any acquaintance at all with the veriest rudiments?

As to a supply of Doctors and Nurses, would it not be possible to form a reserve of these in a manner which will be agreeable to the doctors and nurses themselves, and at the same time safeguard the real interests of the State? The suggestion is that every year Government should say to the young doctors who are just concluding their courses at the various hospitals, something like this:—"In the case of a "very great national emergency arising within the next 12 "months or so, may I count on your services, may I register "your name in the Reserve of Officers? If so, please pass the "barest elements of drill to give me an excuse for handing you "this sword (which costs £5) and £95." It is very probable that the leading lights of the medical profession would back up Government in this effort to secure the services of the young members of their profession when such services would be wanted. On the other hand, the fact of a young doctor holding a commission in the Reserve of Officers could hardly fail to benefit him greatly in the early stages of his professional career.

I have now come to an end of the suggestions and proposals which I have been bold enough to put forth and formulate for the establishment of an Expansory Overseas Army, to meet certain national exigencies which most people are agreed are inevitable, and some believe to be imminent. As to the general desirability of the two main ends of the scheme, the securing of the Scientific Arms and the guaranteeing of the Future of the Soldier, there cannot of course be two opinions. The writer is merely echoing the voice of experts who have made a special study of these questions, who are—what the writer does not pretend to be—real authorities on the subject of Army Reform. It will be seen that with the exception of the Sponsor Plan, there is scarcely anything at all original in the whole of my proposals. But with regard to this particular scheme of getting the men in the first instance, is not the plan *well worth being thoroughly looked into?* The absence of a

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COST OF THE SCHEME.

3.		IV.			
Sponsors' Separation Allowances.	Srs on Men.	Abolition of present Establishment of Militia, Yeomanry and Reserve	Total Saving each year.	Total Charges each year.	Net saving each year.
£.		£.	£.	£.	£.
182,500	1	3,329,680	4,129,680	3,714,800	414,780
365,000	2	"	4,729,680	4,272,834	456,846
547,500	4	"	5,329,680	4,905,828	523,852
730,000	Is	"	5,914,680	5,256,843	657,837
912,500	Of.	"	5,914,680	5,611,866	302,814
1,095,000	Im-	"	5,914,680	5,881,876	30,000
1,153,857	mer-	"	5,974,680	5,941,883	32,797
"	in	"	6,034,680	5,993,893	40,787
"	they	"	6,094,680	5,993,893	100,787
"	in	"	6,154,680	5,973,893	180,787
"	1 in	"	6,214,680	5,993,893	220,787
"	ions,	"	6,279,680	5,993,893	285,787
"	1 of	"			

ARY OF CHAI	£.	£.	£.
hed.	"	"	3,885,850
ervice and Short	would only be	"	
ured.	"	"	3,885,796
paration allowan	"	"	
olutely open.	ear gets larger	"	8,585,796
s automatic.	sa. until in the	"	1,000,000
constituted.	be £2,150,000	"	36,500,000
is.	on the 21st to	"	
entire burden of	"	"	
ers.	"	"	
nurses.	"	"	
Volunteers, and	£.	"	14,105,796.

to page 21.

APPENDIX.

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APPENDIX.

EXPLANATIONS OF AND REMARKS ON ESTIMATES.

COST.

Cost Column 2.—Opposite year 6 you see the figure £1,640,408 ; this represents 149,128 premiums of £11 paid annually to secure each of the Longs his pension and refresher bounties as detailed in conditions of enlistment. There are 38,128 Longs on the Home Establishment of the Regular Army, 36,000 in the Colonies, 75,000 in India—total number 149,128.

A word of explanation as to the figures opposite the early years in this column. The way I arrive at them is thus : the Director of Recruiting lays great stress on the fact that recruiting is not elastic ; I therefore base my calculations on the following procedure being taken at the initial stages of the scheme. Let us assume that under present arrangements (*i.e.*, the scheme not being in force but about to be set on foot) 25,000 men are required for the foreign garrisons, and 10,000 for the Home Establishment. In the first year I enlist 15,000 Longs and 10,000 Shorts. The 10,000 Shorts, of course, remain in England, the 15,000 Longs, when trained, go abroad. But 25,000 are wanted to go abroad ! I therefore convert 10,000 approved men of those now serving under existing (*i.e.*, medium service) contracts, into Longs—that is to say, I offer these men the same annual premium as I give the new Longs, namely, £11 a year, and say to them, “Will you for a yearly bounty of £11 serve on for another six years and receive at the end of that time what this annual £11 will amount to ?” I do this every year as long as it is necessary, and as far as I can see it will have to be done for five years. By the twelfth year there will be none of the converted Longs in the Service, they will all have disappeared, and the whole Army will be full of Longs and Shorts enlisted under the new arrangements.

It will be seen that with these arrangements a gap of 10,000 men is made every year in the Home Establishment during the early years of the scheme, and it is only in this manner, I presume, that any reduction of *personnel* can be effected, unless, indeed, men are transferred from the colours into the Reserve and more than 25,000 recruits be enlisted ; but I base my calculations

on the Director of Recruiting's remark that recruiting is not elastic, and also on the leading principle of my plan that only the very best should be admitted into the Service.

Cost Column 3.—Opposite the seventh year appears the figure £1,153,857. This sum represents the annual cost of all the sponsor's separation allowances in a normal year, *i.e.*, 1s. \times 365 days \times 63,225 Short-service men serving with the colours of the Regular Army.

Cost Column 4.—Opposite the seventh year the sum of £865,393 appears as gratuity money, *i.e.*, 9d. \times 365 days \times 63,225 Shorts.

It is, of course, impossible to know how many Shorts will have to be annually enlisted at the start off of the scheme, but I take it that 10,000 are enlisted the first year, and another 10,000 annually until the arrangements are in full swing, when the number of Short recruits admitted in one year will be 28,380, *i.e.*, 15,000 for the infantry, and 13,380 for the other arms.

Cost Column 5.—Opposite the sixth year you will see the sum £1,655,870. This, I take it, will be the entire annual cost of the new Militia and Yeomanry Army and Reserve in a normal year. How do I arrive at this figure? The Militia and Yeomanry Army under the scheme will train for fourteen days annually.

Deducting 7,000 Blue Militia from the figure 106,619, the entire total of the Militia and Yeomanry Army, we get 99,619. I allow 5s. a day clear pay all round to these 99,619 men for their fourteen days of training*—that is to say, £348,667. For the other training expenses in connection with this Army I allow £533,248—that is to say, £5 7s. 6d. per man per day of training (this is exclusive of officers). I arrive at this figure £5 7s. 6d. by allowing £209,200, or which is 3s. per head for the fourteen days for the entire number 99,619, this is to cover every imaginable expense except their pay and clothing. For their clothing I allow £249,048, which means £2 10s. per head per annum—that is to say, one £5 set out to last each man two years. I also allow a further sum of £75,000 to cover expenses in connection with the more expensive training of the Artillery and Yeomanry.† These three sums amount to £533,248, which means £5 7s. 6d. per man. Compare this estimate with the present cost of Militia up-keep, and you will see that I am on the safe side.

* An appreciable number of these, *i.e.*, certain Engineers, Army Medical, &c., would not undergo the annual training. All the better for the Estimates.

† See also remarks on Cost, Column 6.

On page 234 of the Army Estimates the sum provided for the Militia of the United Kingdom for 1906 is £1,337,650; deduct £760,200 for pay, bounty and allowances, and you get £577,450. Now there were present at the Militia training in 1905 81,807 *all ranks*, so we must presume that this sum of £577,450 is to meet the charges of a similar number in 1906 *all ranks*. This means that £7 1s. 2d. is allowed per head to cover all expenses coming under Votes 2 to 10 on page 234 of the Army Estimates; that is to say, that £7 1s. 2d. per head will pay for the medicines, lodging and stable allowances, field allowances, hire of buildings to supplement barracks, barrack services, conveyance of troops, conveyance of stalls, provisions and allowances in lieu, forage and paliasse straw, fuel and light, water supply and advertisements, clothing services, equipment and barrack stores, small arms, ammunition, &c., and barrack accommodation, in connection with 81,807 of *all ranks*, all of whom train for 28 days and the recruits for 42, so I must be well on the safe side by allowing £5 7s. 6d. per man, *exclusive of officers*, for expenses in connection with training, which only lasts 14 days.

Thus the pay of the men of this Army, exclusive of officers, amounts to £348,667, and their other expenses (Votes 2 to 10) £533,248.

What do the officers cost? £112,119, because I allow £3 daily for the 14 days of training to each of the 1,967 officers to cover pay allowances and everything. I also allow £15 uniform allowance per annum to each of the 1,967 officers.

The retaining fees of the Reserve of the Militia and Yeomanry Army cost £3 a man—that is to say, £407,415.

The expenses of the *Blue Militia* are as follows:

Each man gets, not 5s. clear pay but 7s., 3s. per man is allowed for other expenses (Votes 2 to 10)—that is to say, 10s. per man for the 21 days of training:—

	£
7,000 × 10s. × 21 days - - - -	73,500
£5 (not £2 10s. like the rest of the Militia and Yeomanry Army) per man per annum is allowed for uniform, this means -	35,000
Each man gets 10s. a day for 30 practice afternoons at the respective local butts throughout the year, 7,000 × 10s. × 30 Saturdays - - - -	105,000
Prizes and Competitions - - - -	5,000
Officers, 140 × £15, uniform allowance -	2,100
140 × £3 × 21 days - - - -	8,820

Entire annual cost of Blue Militia £229,420

To cover any other annual expenses in connection with the Militia and Yeomanry Army I allow £25,000 annually. I do not myself see how any extra annual expenditure can amount to this sum, but I put it down to be on the safe side ; it should, at any rate, cover the difference of pay of the N.C.O.'s which I have not allowed for, so the total figure, £1,655,870, is made up thus :—

Pay of Militia and Yeomanry Army, exclu-	£
sive of officers - - - - -	348,667
Votes 2 to 10 for ditto - - - - -	533,248
Entire cost of officers - - - - -	112,119
Retaining fees of Reserve - - - - -	407,415
Cost of Blue Militia - - - - -	229,420
Other annual expenses - - - - -	25,000
	<hr/>
	£1,655,869

It will be seen that it is not proposed to give any retaining fees at all to the Militia and Yeomanry Army. This is on the principle of value for value. Every man gets splendid pay for every day of duty performed. All these men are Reservists. Each man has received a gratuity, and assistance in getting civil employment from the Organization of Officers engaged in that work. If mobilised for active service every man will get the excellent pay already provided by Government, and in addition to this he will also receive the Universal War Batta.

But how do I arrive at the figure opposite the first year, £2,796,450 ? I get it in the following manner :—

The present effective cost of the Militia of the United Kingdom is - - - - -	£1,835,980
Militia Reserve - - - - -	40,000
Imperial Yeomanry effective cost - - - - -	520,200
Army Reserve effective cost - - - - -	1,133,500
	<hr/>
	£3,529,680

(See pages 228, 234 and 235 of Army Estimates.)

This sum, £3,529,680, appears therefore in Column IV. of the Saving, but it is obvious that the transformation of the present Militia and Yeomanry into the glorified Militia and Yeomanry Army will be a matter of a few years. How is the transformation to take place ? The method I suggest is the following :—

To set the scheme on foot I simply don't call out the existing Militia, nor do I enlist any fresh Militia recruits. Existing Militia receive their non-training bounty. Say there are as many as 75,000 Militia receiving this bounty, $75,000 \times £5$ means £375,000, deduct £375,000 from £1,337,650 (see column 2, page 234,

Army Estimates), this means a saving of £962,650. But the Blue Militia *are at once organised* as these are urgently needed for the purposes of the striking force. Their cost is £229,420, so the net saving on the first year will be not £962,650, but £733,230. Deduct £733,230 from £3,529,680 and you arrive at the figure I have put down opposite the first year, namely, £2,796,450. The entire net saving on these Militia changes in the sixth year amounts to £1,873,811. But as this will only be gradually arrived at, I allow for an increase of saving each successive year of only £221,116, until in the sixth year the entire saving amounts to £1,873,811, or to state it differently, the entire cost of the Militia and Yeomanry army in the sixth year would be, as stated above, £1,655,869.

Cost Column 6.—The present home establishment of Cavalry is 12,748 *all ranks*; my proposed establishment is 16,372 men exclusive of officers. For this increase in the Cavalry I allow from the third year another £200,000 annually to cover the extra charges in the matter of forage and remounts and registration of horses, &c.

Cost Column 7.—£308,000, which appears opposite the second year, is made up by multiplying 1,400 by £220, which is the amount Government allows under the scheme for the entire annual cost in connection with the pay and training of a short service officer, while actually serving and learning his work. Thus each young officer will cost the Government £440, but then, as I have explained in the body of the scheme, this sum secures to Government the certainty of being able to count on the services of a very large reserve of *trained company* officers whenever such may be needed, and this Government cannot do at present. Regarded in the light of retaining fees spread over eight, nine or ten years, the cost to Government would be ridiculously small even in the event of only 60 or 70 per cent. of these young gentlemen turning up at a time of national crisis when they would be urgently wanted, and we know very well that there is not the slightest chance of there being any backwardness displayed in their coming to the front whenever an occasion should arise necessitating any call on their activity and patriotism.

Cost Column 8.—The amount in this column is to cover the cost of the £25 certificates Government pays to the corps of Short-Service Officers for passing examinations while they are in the Reserve. I calculate that on an average one officer will pass one examination a year.

Cost Column 9.—£70,000 is allowed for securing in a similar manner the inclination of as many doctors and nurses as Government may think necessary to provide against the time of a great national emergency.

SAVING.

Saving Column I.—You will see that in the twelfth year I knock off £365,000 of the present gratuities and deferred pay given to soldiers on discharge, &c. ; this item is G. on page 23 of the Army Estimates. By this time, *i.e.*, the twelfth year, the entire Army will be filled with Longs and Shorts, all of whom will be otherwise provided for. I should think that this item will have disappeared long before the twelfth year, but as there will be converted Longs among the new Longs until the eleventh year, to be on the safe side I only allow for a gradual reduction of this charge to begin in the seventh year.

*Saving Column II.**—Opposite the fourth year the sum of £2,384,940 represents £60 × 39,749 men. This is the number of the reduction under the scheme (spread over four years) of men serving with the colours in the home and colonial establishments of the regular army. This figure, 39,749, does not include 4,863 men, the present permanent staff of the Militia and Yeomanry. The saving on these is allowed for under column IV.

Am I over-estimating the saving in fixing it at £60 a man? I do not see that I am when we remember (1) that the average cost of a man is £72 8s. 1d. (p. 228, Army Estimates); (2) that a man in South Africa costs £125 annually, and under the proposed scheme there will be some thousands of men less in that country; (3) that owing to the flooding of the Army with extraordinarily good *personnel*, the expenses in connection with hospitals, prisons, etc., will be very materially reduced.

Saving Column IV.—See remarks on Cost, column V.

*My figures are, of course, based on the last published Army Estimates (1906-7).

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